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CLAYTON ACT, SECTION 5: AID TO TREBLE
DAMAGE SUITORSV
PRIVATE parties may recover treble damages for injuries caused by viola-
tions of the antitrust laws. 1 Although intended to provide a principal means
of policing industry and enforcing antitrust laws,2 private litigants, despite
possible triple recovery, initially were reluctant to bring these suits.3 To
*Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 558 (1951).
1. § 4 of the Clayton Act reads in part: "Any person who shall be injured in his
business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue there-
for in any district court of the United States ... and shall recover threefold the damages
by him sustained and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." 33 STAT. 731
(1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1946), superseding similar provisions in the Sherman Act, 26
STAT. 210 (1890) and 28 STAT. 570 (1894).
Injuries arising from violations of the Sherman Act, 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U.SC.
§1, §2 (1946), the Clayton Act, 38 STAT. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 12-§ 14 (1946) and
both the civil and criminal provisions of the Robinson-Patman Act, 49 STT. 1526 (1936),
15 U.S.C. § 13 (1946) fall within the provisions of this section. For recent full survey
of Robinson-Patman treble damage cases, see Rowe, Price Discrimination, Competition,
and Confusion; Another Look at Robinson-Patonan, 60 YA.E L. J. 929, 940 n. 65, 941
rL73, 953 n. 19S, 961 n.210 (1951).
Incorporated cities, Chattanooga Foundry Works v. Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390 (1906),
and states, State of Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159 (1942), but not the United States,
United States v. Cooper, 312 U.S. 600 (1940), are "persons" within the meaning of
Section 4 and can sue for treble damages. Proposed amendments allow the United States
to recover treble damages, H.R. 109, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951), or only actual damages,
H.R. 3408, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951).
The treble damage trial judge determines a "reasonable attorney's fee" within his
discretion on the basis of character of services rendered, amount of time consumed and
result achieved. See, e.g., Connecticut Importing Co. v. Frankfort Distilleries, 101 F. 2d 79,
S1 (2d Cir. 1939). But cf. Milw-aukee Towne Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 190 F. 2d 561 (7th
Cir. 1951), where, on appeal, attorney's fees were reduced from $225,O00 to $75,000.
Commenting on the "delicate and embarrassing" matter, the court noted that the "fabulous
amount allowed" would "equal the total annual salary received by all members of the
Supreme Court." Id. at 569-70. Since trial courts cannot take into account the possibilty
of appeal, appellate courts may add additional attorney's fees. American Can Co. v.
Ladoga Canning Co., 44 F. 2d 763 (7th Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. S99 (1930).
2. See H- T O & TILL, ANT rST IN Aco-, 5-10 (TNEC 'Monograph 16,
1940) ; Testimony of Walton Hamilton, Hearings before the Subconinittee ois Study oJ
Monopoly Power of the Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 7905, 81st Cong., 2d Sess.,
Pt. 5, 56 (1950). For conflicting views on the need and efficacy of private suit, see 21
CONG. RFc. 1763 (1390); id. at 2569.
3. In the first fifty years of Sherman Act enforcement only 175 reported suits
were brought. Only 13 suitors were awarded judgments, totaling $1,270,000. Eleven
other judgments for $12,756,000 were overruled by appellate courts. Comment, 18 U. oF Cm.
L. RE . 130, 138 (1950). These figures do nut include out-of-court settlements. The suits
were few in comparison with the number of businessmen probably injured by antitrust viola-
tions in this period.
Since 1940, there has been an acceleration in both government antitrust enforcement
and private suits.
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prevail they had to prove three difficult elements: (1) defendant's violation
of antitrust law;4 (2) causal connection between that violation and plaintiff's
injury;5 and (3) amount of resultant damages." And courts, impressed by
Antitrust cases (filed in U.S. district courts)
1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950
Government Cases
Civil 28 35 24 12 20 18 33 19 39 42
Criminal 40 13 9 15 11 18 27 34
Private Civil Cases 110 70 40 50 27 68 64 78 162 157
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECroR OF THE ADMINIsTRATiVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS 1950 113 (transmitted to the Judicial Conference of the United States, Sept. 8, 1950).
These data, however, indicate the number of suits filed in district courts, while the pre-
1940 data only refer to cases actually reported.
4. Proof of an antitrust violation is difficult, since the violation is often based on a
tacit agreement consisting of complex terms. E.g. FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S.
683, 687 (1948) (100,000 page record compiled in three years of FTC hearings on basing
point system). Recognizing these difficulties, courts allow proof of conspiracy by infer-
ential proof. E.g. Milgram v. Loew's Inc., 192 F.2d 579 (3d Cir. 1951) (conspiracy inferred
from conscious parallel business practices). "[In] this modern era of increasing subtleties,
it is rare indeed for a conspiracy to be proved by direct evidence." Id. at 583. However,
private litigants must prove defendant's antitrust violation without evidence compiled by
a grand jury and without the investigatory facilities available to the government. See
HAMILTON & TILL, ANTITRUST IN AcTiON 83 (TNEC Monograph 16, 1940).
5. This is usually difficult to show because the injury may in part have been caused
by other factors which influence the plaintiff's business fortunes, such as obsolete equip.
ment, economic recession or poor management. See HAMILTON & TILL, ANT vRUsT IN
AcTioN 84 (TNEC Monograph 16, 1940). Moreover, courts often demand certainty of
proof for establishing the "fact" of damage. E.g. Locker v. American Tobacco Co., 218
Fed. 447 (2d Cir. 1914). However, the Supreme Court recently relaxed these proof
requirements, holding that a jury might conclude "from the proof of defendants' wrongful
acts and their tendency to injure plaintiffs' business, and from the evidence of the decline
in prices, profits and values, iwt shown to be attributable to other causes, that the de-
fendants' wrongful act had caused damage to the plaintiffs." Bigelow v. R.K.O. Radio
Pictures, 327 U.S. 251, 264 (1946) (emphasis added). Cf. Milwaukee Towne Corp. v.
Loew's Inc., 190 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 20 U.S.L. WEM< 3179 (1952) ("fact"
of damages not found where injury arose from alleged refusal of motion picture producer
to license first run pictures because evidence insufficient to show that plaintiff requested
such pictures).
6. Proof of damages has been a major obstacle to treble damage recoveries. T4e
plaintiff usually bases his damage claim on either increased costs, Thomson v. Cayser,
243 U.S. 66 (1917), or on lost profits, Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment
Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555 (1931). The lost profits method of computing damages
necessarily involves conjectural proof as to the amount of the plaintiff's profits if the
defendant's illegal activity had not interfered. However, the Supreme Court recently
held inferential proof acceptable where none better was available. "[T]he wrongdoer may
not object to the plaintiff's reasonable estimate of the cause of injury and of its amount,
supported by evidence, because not based on more accurate data which the wrongdoer's
misconduct has rendered unavailable." Bigelow v R.K.O. Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251,
265 -(1946) revers'ig, 150 F. 2d 877 (7th Cir. 1945) (damages based on plaintiff's lost
profits shown by (1) a comparison between profits prior to the restraint with probable,
subsequent profits, and (2) a comparison of actual profits during the period of restraint
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the severity of threefold damages,7 held plaintiffs to high standards of proof.s
Moreover, private litigants were often unwilling to take the financial gamble0
involved in protracted litigation 10 with wealthy corporate defendants.
To encourage treble damage suits by reducing the plaintiff's required proof
and litigation expenses, Congress enacted Section 5 of the Clayton Act.1
with those of comparable competing theatres of defendants) ; noted 41 ILI_ L. R%.E. 462
(1946). See Milwaukee Towne Corp. v. Loew's Inc., 190 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1951).
Noting reversal of its holding in Bigelow case, supra, that proof of damages was too
speculative, the Seventh Circuit states that the Supreme Court "leaves little room for
defendants' attack upon the court's damage findings, providing, of course, the fact of
damage is shown." Id. at 566.
For impact of liberalized rules for proving damages on treble damage suits see
McConnell, The Treble Damage Action, U. OF ILu. L. Fonutm 659, 664 (1950); Com-
ment, 18 U. of Cm. L. Rnv. 130, 133, 138 (1950).
7. "The right which the said Acts (i.e. the Sherman and Clayton Acts) give to a
person to recover three-fold the damages he has sustained, is an unusual one, the remedy
is drastic, and the Acts are to be strictly construed . . ." Westor Theatres, Inc. v.
Warner Bros. Pictures, 41 F. Supp. 757, 762, (D.N.J. 1941). Whether or not damages
are punitive or compensatory is disputed. See VoId, Are Threefold Damages Undcr the
Anti-Trmst Act Petl or Compensatory, 28 Ky. L.J. 117 (1940).
8. See McConnell, supra note 6, at 661, 663 (1950).
9. A principal obstacle to treble damage suits is the extreme cost of litigation.
Pre-trial preparation demands research by highly-skilled attorneys; the trial is long,
susceptible to delay and procrastination; appeals and new trials are endless. Thus,
corporate offenders, possessed of vast resources, are often able to exhaust their opponents.
For discussion of costs, see Hearings on H.R. 7905, supra note 2, pt. 5. 3 (1950) ;
-AmxrLTox & TIIu, ANTIRusT IN Ac-iox 83 (TNEC Monograph 16, 1940); Daniel,
Enforcement of the Shernam Act by Actiows for Treble Damages, 34 VA. L RLv. 901,
923 (1948).
"I tell them [prospective suitors] that if they do not have 25,000 for the taking of
depositions under the Federal rules, at least $25,000 just for costs and transcripts and
traveling expenses, that they had better drop the suit . . . The methods by which
a plaintiff can be worn out... Witnesses are supposed to show up at 10 o'clock, and
they do not show up until 11. You ask them a few questions, and it is the wrong
officer of the company.. . .Then perhaps if things get too bad then you can go into
court and get the court to make an order against that kind of tactics. So there are
long arguments on that . . .' Testimony of Thurman Arnold, Hearings before a
Subcommittee of the Comnittee on the Judiciary on S. 1910, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 3
(1949).
10. The median length of time from filing to disposition of treble damages suits
was twice that of all civil cases tried; the median length of trials was five times that of
all cases tried. ANNUAL REpoRT, supra note 3, at 114. See, e.g., the Bausch Machine
Tool Company's attempt to recover damages against the Aluminum Company of America.
The litigation continued for 16 years and included "the filing of two suits which were
never tried, two jury trials ... a bill of discovery, three appeals and tw:o petitions for
certiorari (both denied) at an expense of hundreds of thousands of dollars." Note, 37
Cot. L. :Ev. 269, 288 (1937).
11. Section 5 provides: "A final judgment or decree hereafter rendered in any civil or
criminal prosecution or in any suit in equity brought by or on behalf of the United States
under the antitrust laws to the effect that a defendant has violated said laws shall b2
prima facie evidence against such defendant in any suit or proceeding brought by any
1952]
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This permits treble damage plaintiffs to introduce final12 criminal judgments
and equity decrees rendered against defendants in antitrust actions brought
by the government 13 as prima facie 14 evidence of all matters determined
and essential to the prior adjudication.' 5 Section 5, until recently, has been
other party against such defendant under said laws as to matters respecting which said
judgment would be an estoppel as between the parties thereto: Provided, this section
shall not apply to consent judgments or decrees entered before any testimony has been
taken." 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. 16 (1946).
This section was enacted in response to a message by President Wilson. "I hope
we shall agree in giving private individuals . . the right to found their suits for redress
upon facts and judgments proved and entered in suits by the Government. . . . It is not
fair that private litigants should be obliged to set up and establish again the facts which
the Government has proved. He can not afford, he has not the power, to make use of such
processes of inquiry as the Government has command of . . ." 51 CONG. REa 1962, 1964
(1914).
12. A "final judgment or decree" within the meaning of § 5, supra note 11, refers to
a "final disposition of the case, i.e., a final judgment by reason of failure to appeal with-
in the statutory period, or a final judgment by reason of an affirmance of the appeal by the
court of last resort." Twin Ports Oil Co. v. Pure Oil Co., 26 F. Supp. 366, 369 (D.
Minn. 1939), aff'd, 119 F.2d 747 (8th Cir. 1941), cert. deied, 314 U.S. 644 (1941).
See cases cited in note 16 infra where judgments and decrees held inadmissible under § 5
because of lack of "finality."
13. These judgments and decrees had been unavailable to a private suitor. Buckeye
Powder Co. v. DuPont Powder Co., 248 U.S. 55 (1918) (judgment rendered prior to
passage of § 5 inadmissable as evidence in treble damage suit). For general discussion of
admissibility of judgments as evidence in another cause of action see 4 WiWaoRE, EvINsENC
§§ 1346, 1346a (3d ed. 1940); 5 id. § 1671a.
14. L.e., sufficient, standing alone and uncontroverted, to sustain a judgment on the
issues for which it is submitted. But the evidence loses its prima facie qualities in the
face of countervailing evidence. Thus, it does not shift the burden of proof but merely
compels the defendant to come forward with evidence. "Being prima facie evidence, the
judgment is not conclusive in this case. It is merely sufficient evidence of a violation
by these defendants of the anti-trust laws to put these defendants to their proof." Charge
to the jury, quoted in Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 181 F.2d 70, 76
(7th Cir. 1950), rev'd on other grounds, 340 U.S. 558 (1951). Once the defendant comes
forward with evidence, as he invariably does, the burden of going forward shifts back
to the plaintiff. Hearings on H.R. 7905, supra note 2, pt. 5, p. 12 (1950).
"In general the courts have looked upon suits for triple damages with such disfavor
that the statutory presumption in favor of the plaintiff is rather lightly entertained and
the rebuttal rather generally indulged. The provision is quickly swallowed up in the
rules of evidence and presently there is little to distinguish the trial from others of its
kind." HAMILTON & TILL, ANTITRUST IN AcrioN, 83 (TNEC Monograph 16, 1940).
See also note 33 infra.
15. The statute, supra note 11, simply mentions "estoppel" which could connote res
judicata as well as collateral estoppel. Res judicata would apply not only to matters
litigated and determined, but to any other admissible matter which might have been
offered to sustain the judgment; while collateral estoppel applies only to matters
actually litigated and essential to sustain the judgment. For a comparison of res
judicata and collateral estoppel, see Scott, Collateral Estoppel by Judgneut, 56 HARv.
L. Ray. 1 (1942) ; RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS §§ 68, 69, 70 (1942) ; Cromwell v. County
of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 353 (1876).
Although the Congressional debates on the Clayton Act do not distinguish between
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applied only in private suits following successful equity proceedings by the
government for Sherman Act violations.' 6 Since specific findings of fact
accompany equity decrees, the issues determined in these proceedings are
apparent. Therefore, the trial judge in the treble damage suit under Section
the two types of estoppel, Congress probably %%,as thinking in terms of collateral estoppel,
since it assumed that the judgment was to be evidence of the "facts determined" rather
than of the facts that might have been determined. See statement of Senator Walsh,
51 CoNG. RFC_ 13851 (1914).
The courts have never specifically defined "estoppel" in § 5, although in one case it
was assumed in dicta that this term referred to "estoppel by judgment" (collateral
estoppel). Fifth and Walnut Inc. v. Loew's Inc., 176 F. 2d 587, 593, (2d Cir. 1949),
cert. denied, 338 U.S. 894 (1949). In the few cases where § 5 has been applied
it has been treated as connoting collateral estoppel. E.g. Emich 'Motors Corp. v. General
otors Corp., 340 U.S. 558 (1951). "Such estoppel extends only to questions 'distinctly
put in issue and directly determined' in the criminal prosecution. . . . In the case of a
criminal conviction based on a jury verdict of guilty, issues which were esscnial to the
verdict must be regarded as having been determined by the judgment. . .. Accordingly,
we think plaintiffs are entitled to introduce the prior judgment to establish prima facie
all matters of fact and law necessari!y decided by the conviction and the verdict on
which it was based." (Emphasis added.) Id. at 569.
16. Equity decrees were admitted under § 5 in the following cases. Eastman Kodal
Co. v. Southern Photo 'Materials Co., 295 Fed. 98 (5th Cir. 1923), aff'd, 273 U.S. 359
(1927) ; Rankin Co. v. Associated Bill Posters, 42 F. 2d 152 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. devicd,
282 U.S. 864 (1930); Turner Glass Corp. v. Hartford Empire Co., 173 F.2d 49 (7th
Cir. 1949); DeLuxe Theatre Corp. v. Balaban & Katz, 95 F. Supp. 933 (N.D. Ill. 1951);
Fanchon & Marco v. Paramount Pictures, Inc, 100 F. Supp. 84 (S.D. Cal. 1951). See
also Sinaiko Bros. Coal & Oil Co. v. Ethyl Gasoline Corp., 2 F.R.D. 305 (S.D. N.Y.
1942) (proper for plaintiff to plead decree); H. E. Miller Oil Co. v. Socony-Vacuum
Oil Co., 37 F. Supp. 831 (D. Mo. 1941) (same). But cf. Milgram v. Loew's Inc., 192 F.2d
579 (3d Cir. 1951), affirming 94 F. Supp. 416 (E. D. Pa. 1950). Although the District Court
apparently excluded the decree rendered in United States v. Paramount Pictures, In(.
66 F. Supp. 323 (S.D. N.Y. 1946), 192 F.2d 579, 593 n. 5. the Third Circuit took judicial
notice of decree as background material. "[Tihe past proclivity of these defendants to un-
lawful conduct may be of some significance here, where the conspiracy alleged by plaintiff
is identical in scope and nature to one of the conspiracies found in the Paramount case...
Viewing the facts of this case in the light of the specific finding in the Paramount case, the
inference of conspiracy here is strengthened." Id. at 584. In a vigorous dissent Judge Hastie,
noting the "narrow and precisely defined authorization to use a judgment or decree" rendered
in a public antitrust suit under § 5, concludes, "This statute would have been unnecessary if,
without legislation, courts were authorized to make the present far broader use of prior
wrongdoing... To imply new wrongdoing from past wrongdoing is in itself alien to our
conception of fair trial. To do so without even the introduction of trial evidence and
opportunity to rebut it is doubly wrong." Id. at 594-5. See also Dipson Theatres, Inc.
v. Buffalo Theatres, Inc., 190 F. 2d 951, 958 (2d Cir. 1951).
Equity decrees were not admitted under § 5 in the following cases. Brunsmick-Balke.
Collender Co. v. American Bowling & Billiard Corp., 150 F. 2d 69 (2d Cir. 1945), cert.
denied, 326 U.S. 757 (1945) (FTC order, upon which Circuit Court had not entered
enforcing decree, not a "final decree" under § 5) ; Proper v. John Bene & Sons, 295 Fed.
729 (E.D. N.Y. 1923) (same; FTC proceeding not instituted "under antitrust laws");
Fifth & Walnut, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., 176 F. 2d 5837 (2d Cr. 1949), cert. dcnied, 333
U.S. 894 (1949) (decree, remanded in part, not a "final decree"); Duluth Theatre
Corp. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 72 F. Supp. 625 (D. Minn. 1947) (decree, pending
on appeal, not a "final decree") ; Alden-Rochelle, Inc. v. American Society of Composers,
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
5 simply admits the decree as prima facie evidence of these matters.1 But
criminal judgments, unlike equity decrees, contain no findings of fact; they
are usually bare statements of guilt based on general jury verdicts. Thus,
when Section 5 is invoked in a treble damage suit following a successful
criminal antitrust prosecution, courts must look deeper to decide what issues
were previously determined.
In Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp.1 8 the Supreme Court
in determining the evidentiary effect of a prior criminal antitrust judgment
had to interpret Section 5 for the first time. Emich, an automobile dealer sued
General Motors and General Motors Acceptance Corporation, a wholly-
owned financing subsidiary, for treble damages, alleging cancellation of his
GM franchise pursuant to a conspiracy in violation of the Sherman Act. An
earlier criminal judgment had found GM and GMAC guilty of a conspiracy
to restrain unduly interstate trade and commerce for the purpose of monopoliz-
ing the financing of GM cars by compelling dealers to use the credit facilities
of GMAC.19 The indictment had charged a number of coercive acts, includ-
ing cancellation of non-compliant dealers' franchises, as means of effectuating
the conspiracy. A jury, apparently instructed to find conspiracy only if some
coercive acts were proved, 20 had returned a general verdict of guilty. In the
Authors & Publishers, 3 F.R.D. 157 (S.D. N.Y. 1942) (consent decree); Ulrich v. Ethyl
Gasoline Corp., 2 F.R.D. 357 (W.D. Ky. 1942) (decree, although not consent decree
under § 5, rendered on stipulated facts solely for purposes of equity suit); Buckeye
Powder Co. v. DuPont Powder Co., 248 U.S. 55 (1918) (decree rendered prior to enact-
ment of § 5) ; Volk v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 91 F. Supp. 902 (D. Minn. 1950) (action
under Declaratory Judgments Act not an "action" arising under antitrust laws).
Criminal judgments were not admitted under § 5 in the following cases. Twin Ports
Oil Co. v. Pure Oil Co., 26 F. Supp. 366 (D. Minn. 1939), aff'd, 119 F. 2d 747 (8th Cir.
1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 644 (1941) (judgment, based on plea of nolo contendere,
"consent judgment" under Section 5; judgment, pending on appeal, not "final judg-
ment"); Barnsdall Refining Corp. v. Birnamwood Oil Co., 32 F. Supp. 308 (E.D. Wis.
1940) (plea of nolo contendere); Alden-Rochelle, Inc.v. American Society of Composers,
Authors & Publishers, supra, (same); A. B. Dick Co. v. Marr, CCH TRADE REG. REP.
'48-'51 DEC § 62,762 (S.D. N.Y. 1950) (same).
17. E.g. Rankln Co. v. Associated Bill Posters, 42 F. 2d 152 (2d Cir. 1930).
18. 340 U. S. 558 (1951).
19. United States v. General Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1941), cert.
denied, 314 U.S. 618 (1941).
20. The trial judge instructed the jury, "The ultimate question, after all, is whether,
under all the facts and circumstances the acts of coercion mentioned in the indictment...
have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt . . .," quoted in United States v. General
Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376, 385 (7th Cir. 1941). In affirming, the Seventh Circuit
stated, 'We do not hesitate to hold that the jury findings of conspiracy and coorciot
are supported by the evidence." Id. at 398 (emphasis added). But cf. id at 405: "[I]t
was not necessary for the government to show that a single dealer had in fact been
discriminated against or coerced." "[Ilt was unnecessary for the Government to prove
the performance of any of the acts or means, except for the purpose of establishing venue,
in order for the jury in the criminal proceeding to find defendants guilty." Emich




treble damage suit, Emich introduced the criminal judgment as prima fade
evidence of the defendants' cancellation of his franchise pursuant to the con-
spiracy. The Seventh Circuit, reversing the trial court partly because
of its submission of the criminal indictment to the jury," considered the
criminal judgment prima facie evidence only of conspiracy 2 because it
read the verdict as not necessarily establishing particular coercive acts.P The
Supreme Court reversed. In its view, the criminal judgment was "firmly
rooted in a finding of coercive conduct. '24 Thus it was prima fade evidence
not only of conspiracy, but also of its effectuation by GM's coercion of its
dealers.25 Moreover, the Supreme Court directed trial judges to go beyond
the bare judgment of guilt and determine 20 the issues decided in the criminal
case.
The Enzich decision defines Section 5's utility to private suitors. Trial
courts, -instructed to go behind the prior criminal judgment, may construe
it as prima facie evidence of a treble damage defendant's illegal conspiracy
and also of other litigated issues essential to the judgment. Since in most
criminal antitrust proceedings both a combination to violate the Sherman
21. Emich Motors Corp. v. General 'Motors Corp., 181 F.2d 70 (7th Cir. 1950),
rev'd, 340 U.S. 558 (1951). The court held that the jury might have looked to the
indictment to ascertain the acts committed by GMI pursuant to the conspiracy; that this
was error, since the indictment charged a number of coercive acts, proof of no particular
one of which was essential to a finding of guilt. 181 F. 2d 70, 76-77. The court also
held error the exclusion of certain GM. evidence, id. at 78-,83, and the award based on
speculative nature of the amount of damages, id. at 83-4.
22. "And we think the judgment is available at least for the limited purpose of
establishing that there had been a violation of public rights.... Hence we approve the
ruling of the District Court--'. . . all that was intended by Section 16, 15 U.S.CA.,
,was that plaintiffs in cases of this nature were to be accorded the advantage of establish-
ing a prima fade case of conspiracy to violate the anti-trust laws by merely introducing
the judgment of conviction in the criminal case.' " Id. at 75-76. "The Court of Appeals
construes the section still more narrowly, holding the judgment prima fade evidence
only of conspiracy by respondents." 340 U.S. 558, 567 (1951) (emphasis added).
23. While it is impossible to determine the particular coercive acts found, since the
government did not have to prove all the acts charged, doubtless at least one of these
acts had to be found by the jury. See note 20 supra. Thus, the judgment seems to estab-
lish coercion as well as conspiracy. The Seventh Circuit apparently agreed with this
view in affirming the criminal conviction, although in the treble damage suit it restricts
the prima facie effect of the judgment to the fact of conspiracy. See ibid.
24. 340 U.S. 558, 570 (1951).
25. "W, e are, therefore, of opinion that the criminal judgment was prima facie evi-
dence of the general conspiracy for the purpose of monopolizing the financing of
General M1otors cars, and also of its effectuation by coercing General Motors dealers
to use GMAC." Id. at 570-71.
26. "In summary the trial judge should (1) examine the record of the antecedent
case to determine the issues decided by the judgment; (2) in his instructions to the jury
reconstruct that case in the manner and to the extent he deems necessary to acquaint
the jury fully with the issues determined therein; and (3) explain the scope and effect
of the former judgment on the case at trial." Id. at 572 (emphasis added).
19521
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Act and particular means used to effectuate that purpose are, as a matter of
practice, essential to a finding of guilt, trial judges are free to extend the
prima facie scope of criminal judgments under Section 5 to include these
activities. In the Emich opinion, for example, the Supreme Court regarded
the prior criminal judgment as prima facie evidence of illegal coercion as well
as conspiracy. 27 A treble damage plaintiff may thus be saved establishing by
independent evidence defendant's coercive conduct towards, for example, other
franchised dealers. 28 In this way, proof of the causal link between the con-
spiracy and his injury by consequent coercive acts can be eased.
But even under the Emich decision, Section 5 will be of limited utility to
treble damage plaintiffs. Many government proceedings are terminated by
pleas of nolo contendere or consent decrees.29 Since both of these are exempt
from the application of Section 5,80 fewer prior judgments or decrees are avail-
able to private suitors. And only plaintiffs injured by the illegal activity upon
which the judgments or decrees are based can utilize for Section 5 purposes
the prior government litigation. Moreover, potential plaintiffs will often be
unwilling to stand by for many years until the government litigation has
terminated in final judgment or decree as required by Section 5.31 And
27. See note 25 sipra.
28. Emich, in the trial court, introduced independent evidence of effectuation of the
conspiracy by coercion on dealers to use GMAC. See Amicus Brief for the United States,
p. 38 n. 28, Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 558 (1951).
29. Consent decrees, first used in 1906, have been entered in more than 50 percent
of the'equity proceedings brought by the government between 1906 and July 1, 1950
(280 decrees in 551 cases). "This percentage is even larger if only cases filed within tile
last 10 years are considered." Antitrnst Law Enforcement by the Federal Trade Coln-
mission and the Antitrust Division, Department of Justice, H.R. REP. No. 3236, 81st
Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1951). There has also been an increase in the number of criminal
prosecutions terminated by pleas of nolo contendere. For general discussion see testimony
of Herbert A. Bergson, former Assistant Attorney General in charge of Antitrust
Division, Department of Justice, Hearings on H.R. 6987, stpra note 2, pt. 3, pp. 46-8
(1950).
30. The exemption in § 5, supra note 11, of "consent judgment or decrees" has been
interpreted to include judgments rendered in criminal prosecutions on pleas of nolo
contendere and consent decrees entered in civil proceedings prior to the introduction of
testimony. Twin Ports Oil Co. v. Pure Oil Co., 26 F. Supp. 366, 370-9 (D. Minn. 1939),
aff'd, 119 F. 2d 747 (8th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 644 (1941). See Dix, Decrees
and Judgments under Section 5 of the Clayton Antitrust Law, 30 Gno. L.J. 331 (1942).
These exemptions were designed to save the government time and expense of litigation
by inducing defendants to settle with the government without litigation. H.R.Rra,. No.
627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, 9 (1914); Dix, supra at 344. It is difficult to estimate
the extent to which the exemption from § 5 is responsible for recent increases in consent
decrees, since there are other pressures, such as minimization of litigation costs, on de-
fendants to avoid litigation with the government. For general discussion of reasons moti-
vating defendants to enter consent decrees, see Isenbergh & Rubin, Antitrust Enforce-
inent Through Consent Decrees, 53 HARV. L. REv. 386, 387 (1940) ; L.G's Page: Numcr.
ous Antitrust Suits, Financial World, Jan. 9, 1952, p. 12.
31. See Hearings on H.R. 7905, supra note 2, pt. 5, pp. 3, 5 (1950). For discussion of
what constitutes a "final judgment or decree" within the meaning of § 5 see notes 12 and
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most important, prior judgments and decrees are only prima facie evidence
of issues previously determined, and can be overcome by contrary evidence
introduced by the defendant.3 2 Thus, in practice, a treble damage plaintiff
cannot rely on Section 5 but must relitigate much of the government's case.3
To preclude wasteful relitigation and strengthen antitrust enforcement,
Congress should amend Section 5 by making its evidentiary effects con-
clusive.34  Accordingly, prior adjudication would establish conclusively the
treble damage defendant's violation of antitrust law 35 and all other essential
issues previously determined. An amended Section 5 would encourage private
litigants and bolster the treble damage suit as an antitrust sanction., o More-
16 supra. The statute of limitations is suspended for private suitors when government
institutes proceedings against defendant. 38 STA-T. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. 16 (1946). Since
Congress failed to provide a federal statute of limitations, state statutes apply. For
"patchwork of disparate time limitation in antitrust cases" see Note, 60 Yu.x L. J. 553
(1951).
32. See note 14 supra.
33. "Section 5, in and of itself, means little to a plaintiff unless he fortifies its impact
upon the minds of the jury with a dramatic reproduction, de nozo, of the same kind of
evidence which resulted in the Government's earlier victory. ... Section 5 substantially
decreases neither the length of treble damage suits, the extent of trial preparation nor
the cost .. ." Communication to Y.u. LAw JoLTRN. from Harold Sticlder, attorney
for plaintiff in the Emich Case, dated May 17, 1951, in Yale Law Library. "As a practi-
cal matter the use of a criminal judgment to prove the existence of a public conspiracy
is of very little value. ... [It is] usually desirable to introduce proof of the public
conspiracy outside of the criminal judgment.. ." Communication to YAL. L.w JoumiAL
from Ferris E. Hurd, attorney for defendant in Emich Case, dated May 28, 1951, in Yale
Law Library. See also Hearings on H.R. 7905, supra note 2, pt. 5, pp. 4, 13 (1950).
34. Section 5 of the original house bill provided for a cunclusive presumptiun. H.R. R=.
No. 627, 63rd Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1914). The Senate substituted a prima fade presumption
because it feared that a conclusive presumption would deny due process to treble
damage defendants by depriving them of their day in court. S. REP. No. 693, 63d
Cong., 2d Sess., 45, 43 (1914). A Congressional committee recently considered making
§ 5's effect conclusive in connection with the Denton Bill. Hearings on H.R. 7905, supra note
2, pt. 5. But this proposal was absent in the bill as reported out of committee.
35. "The initial problem merely of proving ... [the antitrust violation] is one
which few persons can afford to undertake." Donovan & Irvine, Proof of Datrages
Under The Anti-Trust Law, 88 U. or P.s. L. Ruv. 511, 525 (1940).
36. Treble damage actions have great potential as antitrust sanctions, since they
threaten antitrust violators with severe financial penalties. E.g. Kiefer-Ste,art Co. v.
Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951), reversing 182 F.2d 228 (7th
Cir. 1950) (trebled damages totaled $975,000 and the amount of attorney's fees was
$50,000). For recent increase in treble damage suits, see note 3 snpro. For discussion
of effect of this increase on public antitrust enforcement, see testimony of H. Graham
Morison, Assistant Attorney General in Charge of the Antitrust Division, Department
of Justice: "[W]e have for the first time since the history of the enactment of the Clay-
ton Act and the Sherman Antitrust Act, begun to see the development of private litiga-
tion under the triple-damage statute, which is of substantial help... It is a substantial
deterrent in whatever area the Government has decrees, and the effectiveness of this is
for the first time being felt. We begin to feel that we have some companion element of
assistance in this which we never had before." Hearings on H.R. 3408, vtpra note 2, pt.
3, p. 15 (1951).
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over, conclusive evidentiary effect would lead to more antitrust settlements,
since Section 5 does not apply to defendants' pleas of nolo contendere and
consent decrees. More effective enforcement by the Antitrust Division would
result.37 And conclusive evidentiary effects in later treble damage suits would
not deny a day in court to antitrust defendants litigating with the govern-
ment.38 Faced with adverse publicity 3' and drastic decrees 40 in government
civil proceedings, sometimes also brought on the heels of criminal conviction,
41
antitrust defendants doubtless litigate fully any issues which subsequently
might be held conclusive against them.
37. See testimony of Herbert A. Bergson, former Assistant Attorney General In
Charge of Antitrust Division, Department of Justice, Hearings on HR. 6987, supra note
2, pt. 3, pp. 46-7 (1950).
38. Cf. expansion of collateral estoppel to bar a plaintiff in a subsequent suit when
raised by a defendant who was neither party nor privy to the prior litigation. Coca-
Cola Co. v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 36 Del. 124, 172 At. 260 (1934) (issues decided against
Coca-Cola in prior suit against Loft, Inc. held conclusive in favor of defendant Pepsi-
Cola in a subsequent suit brought by Coca-Cola against it) ; noted 82 U. OF PA. L. REy. 871
(1934). See also Cox, Res Jedicata: Who Entitled to Plead, 9 VA. L. Ray. 241 (1923).
For expansion of estoppel in similar manner by extension of the concept of privity, see
Taylor v. Sartorious, 130 Mo. App. 23, 40, 108 S.W. 1089, 1094 (1908). However, col-
lateral estoppel apparently has been expanded only as a defensive tool and not as a weapon
of offense. See discussion in dissent, Finlay Elder v. New York & Pennsylvania Motor
Express, Inc., 284 N.Y. 350, 357, 31 N.E. 2d 188, 192 (1940). The major objection to
any expansion of collateral estoppel is that it forces a party in the prior suit to litigate to the
utmost regardless of the value to him of that particular litigation, since the results of the
litigation may later estop him in a controversy with another adversary who had no con-
nection with the first suit and when more is at stake. See Van Moschzisker, Res Judcata,
38 YALE U.J. 299, 303 (1928). This objection has little merit in antitrust litigation,
39. For attempt to counter unfavorable publicity see discussion of A & P's press cam-
paign, Sufrin & Harriman, Reflections on the A & P Case, 2 SYR. L. R=y. 26, 35-6
(1950).
40. E.g. United States v. Pullman Co., 53 F. Supp. 908 (E.D. Pa. 1944) (separation
of manufacture and operation of sleeping cars). But cf. United States v. Aluminum Co.
of America, 91 F. Supp. 333 (S.D. N.Y. 1950) (fabricating plants and ingot production
not separated). See Comment, 60 YALE LJ. 294 (1951).
41. The Antitrust Department sometimes follows criminal prosecutions, in which
evidence is garnered by grand juries, with civil suits against the same defendants, E.g.
criminal conviction of A & P for conspiracy to restrain and monopolize trade in food
industry, United States v. The New York Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 67 F.
Supp. 626 (E.D. Ill. 1946), aff'd, 173 F. 2d 79 (7th Cir. 1949), followed by civil complaint
seeking to (1) separate A & P's manufacturing and processing business from buying and
selling business, (2) separate retail division into independently owned chains, and (3)
dissolve wholesale purchasing and sales agent for produce. Civil No. 52,139 (S.D. N.Y.
1949) CCH TRADE Rw. REP. '48-'51 DEc. ff 61,226.
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